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As you well know, I am not a student of Peirce. I am a thief of Peirce. 
I take from him what I want and let the rest go, most of it. 
Novelist Walker Percy, in Thief of Peirce 
It has never been in my power to study anything-mathematics, ethics, 
metaphysics, gravitation, thermodynamics, optics, chemistry, 
comparative anatomy, astronomy, psychology, phonetics, economics, 
the history of science, whist, men and women, wine, meteorology, 
except as a study of semiotic.. .How.. .rarely I have met any who cares 
to understand my studies, I need not tell you.. . 
Charles Sanders Peirce, in a letter to Lady Welby 
The list of subjects which turn-of-the-century American scientist and 
philosopher Charles S. Peirce enumerated in a letter to the Lady Welby seems 
almost satirical in scope, yet the founder of semiotic' and pragmatism actually 
confronted such a range of topics in his turbulent writing career. According to 
scholars and proponents of Peirce's philosophy, this was not merely the conceit 
of amodern dilettante. Rather, Peirce constructed a theoretical artifice so soaring 
that it encompassed all of his many areas of interest (and potentially everything 
else) in a grand, cosmological theory of signs. This paper cannot serve as an 
adequate review of Peirce's or the Peirceans' work. Nor am I in a position to 
offer a developed polemic for or against Peirce's inclusion on seminar reading 
lists and dissertation bibliographies. In synopsizing a fragment of Peirce's semiotic 
and discussing recent examples of Peirce being referenced in cultural research, 
the best I can hope for is to point interested readers in the right direction to learn 
more-thus, this paper should be read as an indexical sign. In this capacity, it 
also shares (iconically) characteristics with a trailer for a newly-released film: 
presenting in a very brief space some highlights of the Peircean show, relying 
heavily on blurbs from the critics, and hopefully giving the overall impression 
that the real thing is worth the price of admiss i~n.~  
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Although the field of semiotics shares much history with the discipline of 
folklore, the particular importance of Peirce's role on this shared stage has 
vacillated. Below, I offer a preview of some basics of Peircean semiotic, give a 
cursory glance to certain recent scholars of expressive culture who have found 
Peirce useful, and suggest some ways folklorists might benefit, like novelist 
Walker Percy, by stealing a bit from Peirce's rich storehouse of ideas.j 
Two Times Three 
First to give some idea of the theory at stake: "semeiotic" was Peirce's 
word for the elaborate, almost all-encompassing model of signification that 
he constructed. Now widely referred to as "semiotic," Peirce's system was a 
forerunner to what is commonly called "semiotics," or the study of signs 
(linguistic or otherwise), and the processes through which they acquire 
meaning and are used in practice. Although Peirce wrote in the late nineteenth 
century and influenced many of the towering figures in more contemporary 
semiotics (such as Thomas Sebeok, Umberto Eco, and Roman Jakobson) 
and other fields (e.g., Jacques Derrida), his renown pales in comparison 
with his Swiss contemporary, Ferdinand de Saussure. Peirceans insist that 
their muse nonetheless provides a sign theory which is far more useful than 
Saussure's. I will leave it to semioticians to slug this one out, but would like 
to suggest what at least some of the differences might be. 
Saussure's well-known notion of the sign, elaborated in his Course in 
General Linguistics (1966) consists of two parts: an expression, sound, or 
other perceivable figure, the "signifier"; and a concept or meaning to which 
it refers, the "signified." A classic example would be the word "tree" as the 
signifier and the idea of an actual tree as the signified. Saussure suggested 
that this relationship is arbitrary, and thus that there is no natural connection 
between the linguistic signs we use and the things they stand for; but that the 
relationship is also structured, and thus is not really "arbitrary" for all 
individuals at all times. Rather, changes in the meanings of signs happen 
only gradually, over long periods of time, and not at the whim of individuals. 
Saussure also delineated the systemic, structural aspects of language, or 
langue, as opposed to "language in use," or specific utterances in real 
practice-what he called parole. While recognizing that both aspects affect 
language, Saussure's work and the structural linguistics that built on it 
overwhelmingly emphasized langue, the systemic side of things. 
Structuralists who drew from Saussure's work loved (and still love) a 
good duality-the project of structural analysis is often to locate "binary 
oppositions" in order to reveal the shape of the structuring system that determines 
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signs and their use. Three is a more important number to Peirce. Saussure's 
notion of the sign as a dyad-a signifier and signified-is replaced in Peirce's 
model of the sign by a triad, a three-way relationship between a "representamen," 
its "object," and an "inte~-pret~tnt."~ The parts of this triadic relationship roughly 
correspond to another three-part philosophical model: Peirce's ontological modes 
or categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. To try to explicate these 
two threes concisely, I will begin with the modes. 
Imagine you are sitting in a room without exterior windows, but with 
electric lights. The light in the room has a certain quality which you neither 
notice nor reflect upon. Consider the light as a sign referring only to itself, to a 
basic and irreducible "light-nessV-thls approximates what Peirce calls Firstness. 
Now, imagine that someone suddenly turns off the lights. For an instant, you 
experience the collision of two qualities: lightness and darkness. In that instant, 
again before you have time to reflect or think, the experience of two bounded 
qualities in a relationship of polarity might be considered Secondness. After the 
initial shock or flash of Secondness, however, almost at once, you apply the 
relation to memories of prior experiences, to what you know about light, darkness, 
their relationship, the room you're in, etc. Thoughts race into your mind: Someone 
has turned off the lights. The power is out. Who is near the light switch? Is there 
a storm? Each of these thoughts interpret lightness and darkness in the framework 
of general knowledge and past experience about lights, electricity, and windowless 
rooms, and the relationship between lightness and darkness sprouts into multiple 
signs of possible meanings. You experience something that gives you the 
impression or the effect that a relationship between the representamen of 
sudden darkness and the possibility of a sudden loss of power (in this example, 
the object) is genuine. That is, you perceive a connection based on your 
experience with comparable prior situations at the disposal of your memory. 
This is what Peirce calls Th i rdne~s .~  
It must be stressed that this example is analogical-in fact, we do not 
experience Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness separately. Actually, these 
three categories refer to modes of being or kinds of phenomena that combine 
in various proportions to make signs. The three modes always exist in 
relationship with one another. Some other analogies include: 
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness; 
quality, reaction, symbol; 
feelings, reaction-sensations, thought; 
beginning, end, process; 
monads, dyadic relations, triadic relations 
(Sheriff 1994:2, 14) 
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In semiotic these categories describe various degrees of separation from 
an intrinsic quality. The three ontological modes correspond only roughly to the 
three parts of a sign because it is not accurate to assign each part of the sign to a 
mode: the representamen being Firstness, the object Secondness, etc. Rather, 
the ontological modes refer to stages in a process of signification-a process of 
acquiring significance- during which one, two, or three elements of a complete 
sign are related. When the third element joins the relation, semiosis has taken 
place, and the three-way relationship becomes an irreducible triadic sign. Without 
any one of the three components, this relationship is not really a sign. 
Peirce defined a sign as "anything which determines something else 
(its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the 
same way, this interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum" 
(CP 2.303, cited in Barnouw 1986:78).6 This is a bit confusing, for in this 
usage, "sign" refers first to the representamen, only one part of the whole 
triadic sign. A representamen is a thing: a phoneme, a word, a color, a song, 
an epic, a pair of boots. This thing is "read" as referring to something else, 
the sign's object, in a condition of Secondness that calls to mind the signifier- 
signified relationship of Saussure-in langaage, for example, a word signifies 
a concept. An epic may signify a national identity; an object may signify its 
everyday function or a relationship, as in a wedding ring. But to Peirce, such 
a relationship between two components is still without meaning; it does not 
constitute a complete sign. Whereas Saussure argues that the binary sign 
relationship is arbitrary but structured or given in a symbolic/linguistic 
system, Peirce maintains that this relationship must be interpreted as genuine, 
that is, convincing to an interpreter. When this happens, the relationship 
between the representamen and object creates an "interpretant," or an idea 
in the mind of an interpreter that the relationship makes sense. One way to 
think of the interpretant is as a flash of recognition like Helen Keller's that 
the verbal-phonological sign "water" corresponds to the odorless fluid; 
another is to think of it as a "meaning-effect" (see Turino 1999:224). 
So far we have: 
1. R 
'A "sign" or "representamen" (R) signifying only itself. We can only 
know the pure Firstness of an isolated representamen hypothetically, as a 
possibility, but not as an experience distilled from Secondness or Thirdness 
(Sheriff 1993: 157). 
2. R 0 
A relationship between the representamen (R) and an object (0) .  This 
relationship, out of all possible relationships, is a significant one only if it is 
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recognized as genuine, having a meaning effect (the interpretant, I) in the 
mind of an interpreter: 
But this is only the beginning of signification. The interpretant now 
has a relationship (it has Secondness) with the relationship between the first 
representamen and object. This in turn must be evaluated as genuine, creating 
a new interpretant: 
0 
and again.. . 
::: I1 ~ l - r  I2 
Thus I becomes a representamen (Rl) relating to R-0 as its object 
(01), and I1 likewise relates to the initial triad as R2-02, creating 12. Each 
element in the original triad thus eventually has qualities of each mode: 
Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. Each plays different roles in a series 
of nesting signs-in Peirce's words, "and so on, endlessly" (CP 2.274; see 
Sheriff 1989:59-61).' 
Thus for Peirce, a meaningful sign must always involve interpretation 
and is always part of a process. Although it is presented here in a linear, 
abbreviated fashion, the ongoing process of semiosis happens in multiple 
directions and dimensions, clumping signs together in a "snowball effect" 
(cf. Turino 1999:235) and resulting not so much in a linear chain of meaning, 
but in a sort of semiotic web of related signs, a layering of interpretants. A 
verse of a song, then, might create such interpretants as memories of other 
songs, a human relationship ("our song"), or a prior period in the listener's 
life; the interpretant may also consist of unspeakable, corporeal reactions 
such as goosebumps (Turino 1999). While we can still speak of a word or a 
verse as a "sign," then, it also must be understood as many related signs, 
creating different interpretants or meaning effects. 
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Although no sign is without Thirdness altogether, signs can variously 
privilege Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness either in their form (within the 
triad, the relationships can be closer-with more Firstness-r more Thirdly1 
mediated) or the way they are experienced by the interpreter as having various 
proximities to a hypothetical, imaginary, intrinsic quality of Firstness. Peirce 
had names for these various kinds of Firstness, Secondness, and Thlrdness, thus: 
A sign or representamen is one of three kinds (Qualisign, Sinsign, or 
Legisign); it relates to its object in one of three ways (as Icon, Index, 
or Symbol); and it has an interpretant that represents the sign as a sign 
of possibility, fact, or reason, i.e. as Rheme, Dicent Sign, or Argument. 
These three sets of three terms are the 'trichotomies' in Peirce's 
semiotic. (Sheriff 1994:40) 
A qualisign is the sign-type closest to hypothetical Firstness on all axes. An 
icon is a sign with the closest relationship of similarity with its object, a sign 
of "firstish-secondness." Likewise, each component in each trichotomy 
combines Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness of form and quality in a 
particular, characteristic way. Peirce combined these three kinds of threes to 
identify ten classes of signs, so that a particular sign may be identified, for 
example, as a sinsign that functions as an iconic rheme.8 
All this makes for a theory of signs that goes far beyond Saussure's 
familiar signifier-signified dyad, which is more widely taught as the basis 
for a discussion of semiotics. Although numerous semioticians have tried to 
synthesize the best of Peirce and Saussure (see Hanks 1996), some Peirceans 
insist that semiotic is a complete alternative to Saussure's semiology, with 
the crucial difference being triadicity. Briefly put, an important distinction 
lies in Peirce's pragmatic focus on effect or interpretation as the locus of 
meaning, rather than a signing system (a structure) itself. Interpretation 
considered as an inevitable part of the sign (Singer 1984[1978]) allows for 
individual variation from "structural" patterns (Choby 1998:29). In contrast 
with Saussure's preoccupation with linguistic signs, the Peircean semiotic 
also goes beyond language to consider all types of signs.9 
A Folklore Semiotic 
Thomas Sebeok, eminent American semiotician and a folklorist, notes 
that "folklore. . . is, and has been for some time, richly permeated with semiotic 
ideas and practices. . ." (199151). Richard Bauman, who in addition to his role 
as an innovator in folklore has also served as president of the Semiotic Society 
of America, charted in his presidential address how four key modern 
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sernioticians-Vladirnir Propp, Petr Bogatyrev, Jakobson, and Mikhail Bakhtin- 
were also principally concerned with folklore (1982). Like semiotics in general, 
however, semiotics used in the study of folklore has often followed the path 
derived from Saussure, with exceptions (see McDowell 1986; Bauman 1982). 
When Peirce is cited for his sign theory in folkloristic or anthropological 
discussion, often only the second-trichotomy signs (index, icon, and symbol) 
come up. Even more often, however, Peirce inconspicuously takes a place 
alongside other theorists of signs in a scholar's theoretical toolkit-thus, most 
writers who use semiotic "steal" from Peirce, stopping short of a dedicated, 
professed Peirceanism. Thus it seems that Peirce's major channel of influence is 
an indirect one: Peirce filtered through other authors.I0 An intriguingly diverse 
range of thinkers cite the influence of Peirce, including deconstructionist Derrida 
(Barnouw 1989), structural linguist Jakobson (Fisch 1986[1983]:430), Singer 
(1984[1978]), and serniotician Eco (Sebeok 1991:76-79; Innis 1985), and 
Peircean concepts continue to inform others' work through these authors. 
Yet other scholars are enthusiastic about it enough to highlight Peircean 
semiotic in their work. An influential channel for distinctly Peircean ideas 
in anthropology opened with anthropologist Singer's essay "For a Semiotic 
Anthropology" (1984 [1978]). Singer inspired specifically Peircean semiotic 
inquiry-particularly with regard to the social conception of the self-which 
precipitated in an edited volume in Singer's honor (Lee and Urban 1989). In 
their introduction, Benjamin Lee and Greg Urban look to Peirce's processual, 
constitutive semiotic to emphasize that the self is constructed semiotically 
(1989:2). Like much performance-oriented folklore research, which owes a 
great deal to linguistic anthropology (see Kapchan 1998; Bauman 1982, 1989; 
Abrahams and Bauman 1981), 1980s Peircean works like Lee and Urban's 
edition were primarily concerned with questions of language-whether with 
the first-person "I" as a constituent of a cultural sense of self (Lee 1989), or 
with the shortcomings of language to express the experience of suicide 
(Daniel 1989). Several recent efforts to theorize nonlinguistic signification 
have turned to Peirce directly for a model. 
The Untalkables 
In recent years, folklorists and anthropologists have turned to the body 
as a site of meaning, expression, or even of forms of cognition or "thought" 
in their research on "bodylore" (Young 1995[1993]), "somatic modes of 
attention" (Csordas 1993), "the senses in anthropology".(Stoller 1989), 
"embodiment" (Csordas 1994), and extra-linguistic, bodily experiences of 
meaning like "image schemata" (Johnson 1987). Peircean theory's utility 
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for addressing nonlinguistic signs, especially in the corners of his matrix of 
signs devoted to less-systemic, "non-semantico-referential" signs (Turino 
1999:250n2), makes the theory well-suited for such inquiry. This "body" of 
work is concerned with unraveling problems of subject and object that emerge 
in applications of Cartesian notions of a distinct mind and body. While Peirce 
asserts that there can be no human "thought" or "reason" without Thirdness, 
he does not equate Thirdness solely with cognitive thought, language, or 
culture-rather, he considers Thirdness the domain of "habit" (Sheriff 1993), 
which, like later formulations of "habitus" (Bourdieu 1977) suggests a way 
around Descartes's legacy of a model of body and mind as separate by locating 
knowledge and meaning in embodied practice (Turino 1999). 
In work relevant to the folkloric interest in "bodylore," E. Valentine 
Daniel uses Peirce's modes to discuss traumatic experiences of an "aloneness 
disorder" and violence in Sri Lanka (1989, 1996). Drawing on Daniel's work 
in her Master's thesis, medical anthropologist Alexandra Choby discusses 
the experience of "embodied memory" as a profoundly visceral semiosis 
that can bring back much of the trauma of a prior violent experience in its 
recall (1998:5). Using a tendency toward Firstness to identify the intensity 
of the meaning-effect of traumatic memory (p. 52), Choby charges that prior 
anthropological formulations of embodiment, such as Nancy Scheper- 
Hughes's and Margaret Lock's (1986) "The Mindful Body" are dependent 
on a dyadic model of the sign, which does not adequately link individual 
variation and cultural pattern; or phenomenology and structure (1998:51). 
Like Daniel and Choby, ethnomusicologist Thomas Turino is concerned 
with less-mediated forms of semiosis, experiences which strike the interpreter 
with a corporeal, nonlinguistic intensity, but Turino focuses on the power of 
music as a signing system to affect feelings (interpretants) of belonging, identity, 
or again, memory, examining the meaning-effects which pose problems for any 
analogical treatment of music as a kind of language or discourse-what Charles 
Seeger has termed the "linguocentric predicament" of musicology (cited in Turino 
1999:25 lnlo)." To Turino, this is the emotionally powerful dimension of music 
which makes it well-suited to identity practices: "Music involves signs of feeling 
and experience rather than the types of mediational signs that are about something 
else" (1999:224).12 
These expressly Peircean works are concerned with experiences that are 
meaningful but not linguistic, and which apply to areas of expressive culture, 
bodylore, and identity. Reading such work also raises some of the problems that 
come with applications of semiotic, however. One of these lies in using a 
scientific, logical system to describe processes of signification which increasingly 
are being theorized as shiftlng and fluid. While Peirce's vocabulary of neologisms 
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and specific definitions of sign terms enables discussion of the many different 
sign types, it can also lend itself to reduction. For example, to abbreviate Thirdness 
as "culture" oversimplifies both the terminology being used and the process 
being described." The refixing of culture that Peirce's Thirdness may seem to 
invite needs not only to be tempered by a nuanced concept of Thirdness but also 
must respond to critiques of the culture concept itself (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1991; 
Rosaldo 1993[1989]; Gupta and Ferguson 1992). 
Another potential problem revolves around the notion of "genuine" as a 
requisite quality for a sign. The universal scope of Peirce's semiotic, in which 
all are signs, underlies a semiosic cosmogony, in which Peirce imagines a 
"creation" or "big bang" in terms of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness and 
the ongoing evolution of semiosis which follows, creating the universe of signs 
in which we live. In these terms, Peirce posits "natural laws" as signs which 
have created such genuine and consistent interpretants as to be almost without 
variation (Sheriff 1994). On one hand this broad theoretical expanse can be 
interpreted as insisting on the "naturalness" of signs, in direct opposition to the 
arbitrariness which Saussure's model insists on, but which was submerged for 
years in the quest for structure. This idea of natural signs can make a Peircean 
approach a conservative one, which instills prior uses and definitions of words 
(signs) with transcendent value. Thus there is a teleological dynamic in Peirce's 
notion that "all things tend toward habit," that Thirdness is a result of a natural 
gravitation toward order and repetition in a universe of signs. 
But the inclusiveness of semiotic theory can be spun another way if the 
human element of the interpretant is emphasized. Remember, meaning in the 
Peircean sign is a meaning-effect-thus it is contingent, historical, and dependent 
on the act of signification and the experience of signs. I would also suggest that 
this makes semiotic meaning well-suited to ethnographic inquiry. This view of 
Peircean semiotic has much more in common with various kinds of discourse- 
centered linguistic ethnography (see Sherzer 1987; Farnell and Graham 1997; 
Urban 1991), which has its share of Peircean influence, but which also can 
emphasize the particular use of signs over structure or a general, habitual system 
of thirds. Discourse approaches also at times draw on the Bakhtinian notion of 
the sign, by which account meaning occurs dialogically, in the negotiated space 
between a speaker and hearer-that is, between various interpretants (Bakhtin 
1986 t ra the r  than growing in aprogressive march toward universal "habit." In 
these latter kinds of semiotics, the Peircean sign can still be enlisted to help 
describe and make sense of different kinds of signs (the focus on effects is 
particularly useful), but the historical layering of interpretants. that provides the 
basis for Thirdness is seen as provisional, intertextual, and erratic, rather than 
natural and accumulative for all humankind. 
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Conclusion: Thieves of a Theory 
These reservations offer a possible, partial answer to the question raised 
by compelling uses of Peirce: if the theory is so rich, why follow the novelist 
Percy and be only a "thief' of Peirce? Why should we all not be Peirceans? 
Peirce and some Peirceans can come across as suspicious to the reader who 
has benefited from several rounds of "postness" (postmodernism, 
poststructuralism, the postcultural, or postrepresentational), anthropological 
relativist interventions that highlight human variation rather than continuity, 
and critiques of the "Enlightenment" thought which Peirce in some ways 
took for granted. Take, for example, Peirce's hope for a "Normative Science," 
or the importance of words like "logic" and "Reason" in his system. These 
terms have enough semantic nerve endings to make a contemporary reader 
wince-is this another apotheosis of Western metaphysics and the "dead 
white male?'Moreover, in a postmodern period characterized in part by a 
skepticism toward universal or "totalizing" theories (Hebdige 1988), Peirce's 
general theory is about as "meta" as they come: a teleological, architectonic 
system extrapolated from his basic three modes and sign trichotomies to 
account for cosmology, evolution, natural law, aesthetics, and ethics all as 
part of a grand narrative of signs.I4 
Peirce was no doubt steeped in the modem, metaphysical tendencies of 
his day, but is his theory compatible with postmodernism and other contemporary 
developments? The answer depends in part on whether the asker views 
postmodernism as a continuation of the modem project or as a radical break 
with what came before. Whatever else it did and does, modernism split with 
prior thought by embracing a multiplicity of perspectives on reality, though 
often while maintaining the concept of a unified, universal truth underlying 
them all. Some commentators on postmodernity argue that postmodernism as a 
theoretical and aesthetic sensibility merely continues thls trend to greater degrees, 
resulting in recognition of diverse "epistemes," knowledges," and a fragmentation 
or death of the subject-in short, a greater and more elaborated multiplicity 
(Harvey 1990). The issue of Peirce and postmodernism also invokes 
structuralism-in fact, it may be in part attributable to structuralism's falling 
out of favor that overt invocations of Peirce and semiotics seem fewer 
now than in the 1980s. As implied above, however, Peircean theory's 
relationship to structuralism, which largely derived from Saussurean 
linguistic theory, is ambivalent. 
Peirce's semiotic is modern to an extreme degree: it offers a lens that 
can capture a finer-grain picture than Saussurean s e m i ~ l o g y . ' ~  But by 
accepting meaning or truth as human experiences, it differs from a radical 
"unmooring" of meaning that some suspect in postmodernism (Turino 1999; 
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Fabian 1990). Peirce's taxonomy of signs is flexible, even admittedly 
hypothetical, but it is still a taxonomy; though it offers more openness than 
some "systems," it seems to favor irreducibility and explanation (see Kondo 
1990:40). Nonetheless, several Peirceans dispute the association of semiotic 
with modern structuralism, arguing that Peirce is an improvement even on 
post-structuralist "dissidents" such as Roland Barthes (Sheriff 1989; Gorlte 
1992). Others turn to Peirce for a "modern, postrepresentational discourse" 
(Finlay 1990), a postcolonial "counter-discourse" (Adam 1989), or a more 
satisfying way to achieve the critical accomplishments of deconstruction 
(Barnouw 1986). Still others go so far as to characterize Peirce's theory 
itself as postmodern (Merrell 1995). What many of these readings have in 
common is the notion that semiotic still offers an original contribution to theory 
even at this historical moment, more than a century after Peirce began writing. 
One reason to seek in Peirce a mediating category between the poles 
of reifying meaning (structuralism) and deferring it indefinitely 
(postmodernism) is to develop a vocabulary which may prove useful in 
discussing meaning as experienced. In particular, Peirce's work seems useful 
in the ethnographic endeavor in that it provides concepts of meaning in 
context and with reference to specific social actors: the meaning-effect is a 
kind of "meaning-to" someone. Further, in a pragmatic mode, Peirce 
presented even the most grand of his schemes as hypothetical. Understanding 
signification and thus interpretation to be ongoing and constant, Peirce 
suggested that we take his globalizing system, consider what consequences 
would be implied if it were true, and test and revise it like a hypothesis in 
the natural sciences (Sheriff 1994:2-3).16 
This offers an answer to a defining dilemma for ethnographers of 
postmodernity: how can we deal with meanings and signs as both fluid or 
dynamic and real (Sheriff 1989:27)? If we buy the characterization of 
postmodernism as suggesting that nothing is real but form (Barnouw 1986), 
what can we say about the subjects of our writing who see meaning and 
even truth in forms (cf. Sheriff 1994:xiii)? On the other hand, how do we 
avoid presenting people as essences or "gists" (Stewart 1996) in the inherently 
objectifying activity of writing? Peirce suggests one path: to offer hypotheses, 
in full awareness of the fact that they are artificial snapshots of single nodes 
in a vast, constantly spinning web of meaning. This can enable ethnographers 
to speak specifically to varying degrees of "identity value" or other kinds of 
meaning-to in various expressive forms (Turino 1999). Processual meaning, 
identity in constitution, and unresolved tension between received structure 
and individual agency all can find places in this conception of semiosis. 
I would conclude, then, by encouraging a greater familiarity with 
Peirce. Semiotic provides a clear delineation of various sign processes, and 
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this offers heuristic utility, even if it must be "stolen" away from more 
teleological aspects of Peirce's philosophy, and even if the thief finds herself 
in  a position like that of Peirce's philosophical descendent John Dewey, 
who claimed to have learned most from authors with whom he ultimately 
disagreed (Fisch 1986[1983]:427). Let  any use of Peirce, however, also be 
subjected t o  the interrogation of critics of "culture," structuralism, and 
essentialism. In this way we may read for the best in Peirce, and if need be, 
steal it from this prolific and ambitious thinker. 
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contents of the present work, and indeed, may vigorously dispute them. 
1 The singular, article-free form "semiotic" as opposed to "semiotics" is 
usually a marker of Peirce's influence-I use it as such here. In the other corner, 
followers of Ferdinand de Saussure are more likely to use "semiology," as Claude 
Uvi-Strauss did, although Saussure himself tried out alternatives, such as "signology" 
(Sebeok 199 1:61-62). 
2 The standard primary source for Peirce's writings is the Collected Papers 
(1960; CP hereafter), although Peirce scholar Kenneth Ketner has dismissed this 
collection as "so bad and incomplete that it is downright misleading and harmful" 
(quoted in Samway 1995: 135). By Ketner's account, Peirce was often under pressure 
to reduce his essays in length to please editors and complicated his language to 
assuage his own fears of appearing "simple" (in Samway 1995:4). For other sources, 
see the "Further Readings" and Ketner's own bibliography (1986). 
3 I have freely departed from the folklore literature to consider uses of Peirce 
with regard to various aspects of folklife, memory, or expressive culture that make 
for ready dialogue with folklorists. For a vision of how such interdisciplinary 
connections might serve folklore as a discipline, see Bauman (1996). 
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4 John K. Sheriff argues that "Saussure's theory of language is either consistent 
with or has given rise to what has become the prevailing worldview of the Western 
world," that is, a structural binarism (1989:xv). In this light, to argue for supplanting 
the Saussurean dyad with Peirce's triad can be theoretically revolutionary. 
5 This analogy is similar to one Peirce himself used of lights being suddenly 
turned on (CP 1.380, cited in Sheriff 1994:28). Reference to Peirce's Collected Papers 
are cited here in the conventional form for Peirce studies-the number left of the 
decimal gives the volume, while the second number denotes the paragraph. 
6 This is one of Peirce's most concise formations of the sign. For other 
definitions, se Samway 1995:34, Sheriff 1994:33-34, and CP2.303, 1.541, and 2.274. 
7 Some Peirceans use the diagram of a triangle shown below for its utility in 
showing the ongoing process of semiosis. Peircean scholar Ketner argues that this 
misrepresents the triad as a complex of dyads, each represented by a side of the 
triangle (see also Daniel 1984: 19)-which has undergirded some critiques of Peirce's 
system (e.g. Kondo 1990:40) as not really any different from the signifier-signified 
relationship. The triadic relationship which is "fundamental in CSP's semeitoic" to 
Ketner (in Samway 1995: 13) is actually irreducible, and thus better represented by 
the "three-legged snake" with the relationship itself at the center. 
I 
8 This vocabulary has been an obstacle to wide application of Peirce's theory, 
but the terms can provide a specificity that is useful in discussing form. Space 
prohibits their elaboration here, but the intersection of the trichotomies is best 
described graphically on a grid with Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness plotted 
on axes of phenomenology (form) and ontology (material). See Sheriff 1989:67,74; 
Merrell 1995:93; and Turino 1999:233. 
9 Semiotic also allows space for non-human signification, in the fields of 
zoosemiotics or semiosis (message making and transmission) at the cellular level 
(Sebeok 1991), which leads in the direction of "natural signs" theory rather than the 
pragmatic model of semiotic as human practice for which I am aiming here. A more 
sophisticated differentiation of Saussure and Peirce can be found in Sheriff (1989), 
Singer (1984[1978]), and Hanks (1996). 
10 Ketner warns against "the received Peirce."This issue is implicit in arguing 
for a fair and useful "thieving" of Peirce-how much of a whole body of work can 
a reader afford to dismiss while still using some of its terms and models? I will 
again leave it to better semioticians to decide this. In a letter to Walker Percy, Ketner 
recommends Part Two of Eugene Rochberg-Halton's Meaning and Modernity: Social 
Theory in the Pragmatic Attitude (1986) as "a brilliant expos6 of some bad 
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contemporary misuse of CSP among some semioticists" (in Samway 1995:20). See 
also Ketner's essay "Who Was Charles Sanders Peirce? And Does He Deserve Our 
Homage?'(Appendix I1 in Samway 1995:231). 
11 It was perhaps a response typical of the association of "semiotics" with 
Saussure when I asked another ethnomusicologist whether Peirce's theory has any 
utility for his work, and he answered that semiotics to him implies a linguistic 
approach. While this may be the case more often than not, Turino's work offers a 
polemic against such a quick association. 
12 Turino's 1999 article was obviously a great help in writing this paper. 
Readers of that piece will also notice that my take on Peirce's model of the sign 
differs somewhat from his-in particular, I follow Sheriff's work in understanding 
that all signs have first, second, and thirdness; therefore, no sign may be "halted" 
before reaching thirdness as Turino suggests (232). Rather, I would argue that the 
systemic or conventional aspects of music are something like a "language," though 
not a referential one, in which cultural actors are educated to recognize certain 
associations as genuine- for example, the sounds which music theorists call V7. I 
create an interpretent of closure which those trained in the more referential symbols 
of musical theory can name "cadence." Without the verbal terms to articulate this, 
the thirdness of music is a less symbolic kind-a second-thirdness perhaps-but it 
nonetheless provides a basis of habit for the interpretation of signs. I find this 
recognition of non-linguistic thirdness to be absolutely crucial for a relativist 
conception of musical signs, as opposed to one which sees emotion as residing in 
sound itself, thus eliminating the human interpretor and hislher prior experiences 
that culturally-specifically ground significance. 
13 Daniel offers a definition of culture as "a loosely integrated system of 
signs created dialogically in the communicative act between an anthropologist and 
his informants" (1984:229) that should provide the antidote to such a misreading of 
semiotic with regard to "culture." See also Sheriff 199453. 
14 After we both attended a lecture by a Peircean scholar, an audience member 
asked me "Doesn't it feel like you're listening to a Scientologist?Peirceans do get 
excited enough about the theory to make such claims as "it gives us a theory of 
cosmic and human meaning that. . . [leads] to the possibility of unlimited intellectual 
and moral growth and of unlimited survival for the human community" (Sheriff 
1994:xvi). If this raises intellectual defenses, it in part relates back to classical debates 
between the Stoics and Sceptics-while Peirce's thought is Stoical in many respects, 
much contemporary theory is in a more Sceptical mode (Barnouw 1986). Perhaps 
most crucially, Peirce's teleology speaks to a belief in the unidirectional, progressive 
development of human knowledge, a view that seems optimistic at best, or in uglier 
terms, it suggests a sanction of history as written by the "winners" of violent 
confrontations. Peirce's century-old vocabulary should not render him automatically 
anachronistic. For example, by "science," Peirce apparently meant something akin 
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to "discipline" in the academic sense, referring to intellectual endeavors which are 
responsible to and account for learning that has gone before. By engaging "the 
literature" in academic work, we are accepting something like Peirce's "science" as a 
framework, even if our disciplines (anthropology, literary studies, folklore) may be fleeing 
"scientific" methods and terms as quickly as they can. (See Sheriff 1994: 19). 
15 Saussure's influence is so ubiquitous that it hardly needs proponents, but 
for an argument in favor of a rereading of semiology in the present theoretical context, 
see Thibault (1999). This lecture can be found on the world wide web, along with a 
number of other lectures and links on semiotics, including some dealing with Peirce. 
16 This logic is similar to what Peirce called "abduction." For a discussion 
of abduction as it relates to qualitative field research, see Amanda Coffey and Paul 
Atkinson (1996). 
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